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 A key responsibility of boards of directors is to mitigate agency problems resulting from the 
separation of “ownership” and “control” (Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Without boards’ ratification and monitoring of the decision process, management teams 
are more likely to take self-benefit actions, and deviate from the interests of residual claimants. 
Boards of directors are in charge of monetary incentives and the threat of dismissal, keeping 
managers on their toes by aligning managerial benefits with the firm’s interests (Tirole, 2001). 
Agency models prescribe normative actions so that compensation is related to effort and 
performance and that the board fire poor performing CEOs. However, some empirical research 
might find the opposite1. 
 Since the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 was introduced in the US, a minimum number of 
board meetings has been required in many countries such as the United States, United Kingdom 
and India. In addition, the actual number of board meetings and committee meetings has to be 
disclosed in listed firms’ annual reports. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) suggest that board meetings provide a chance for directors to monitor and discuss 
strategies to improve firm’s and the executives’ performance. However, Jensen (1993) argues 
that the information disclosed in board meetings could be somewhat biased in the CEO’s favor, 
since he/she sets up the meeting agendas, reducing the effectiveness of board meetings.  
 There has been little empirical literature that examines the relationship between board 
activities and board effectiveness of monitoring the manager and firm. Using the annual 
meeting frequency alone as a proxy for board monitoring (e.g. Vafeas, 1999; Brick and 
                                                 
1 In pay-firm performance literature, this is no such simple relationship in reality: many studies have found a 
negative relationship between excess compensation and firm performance (e.g. Brick, Palmon, and Wald, 2006); 
the CEO pay-performance sensitivity was mainly dependent on firm’s reward to the top management team(e.g. 




Chidambaran, 2010) could be problematic as it will include inefficient, routine meetings held 
primarily to satisfy firm hierarchy and regulation requirements (Jensen, 1993). In this study, 
we examine whether board activities in discussing actual topics at board meetings enhance the 
relationship between CEO dismissal/compensation and firm performance.  
 Board activities related to processing corporate decisions demonstrate how directors fulfill 
their monitoring obligations, without including noise from routine meetings. Empirical studies 
and surveys (e.g. Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013; Stiles, 2001)2  show that boards of 
directors put most of their effort into monitoring management decisions. Indeed, meetings on 
different topics provide means to re-evaluate CEO and firm performance in relevant 
dimensions by discussing business strategy, risk oversight, board composition and CEO 
succession planning. In some board meetings, directors share and discuss information and 
advice on corporate decisions, provided by board committees, in order to making thorough 
decisions. Further, Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggest that informal interaction can improve 
the efficiency of group work among unfamiliar colleagues. As independent directors are full-
time employees in other organisations, they rarely communicate with each other except in 
discussions at board meetings or informal conversations during meeting breaks. Moreover, the 
meeting agenda and focus can vary across meetings (e.g. Ocasio and Joseph, 2005; Schwartz-
Ziv and Weisbach, 2013). In this paper, we use the number and type of agenda focused 
meetings to proxy for board activities to monitor and improve corporate governance. 
                                                 
2 Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) examine the managerial and supervisory theories of board effectiveness, 
using private data obtained by inspecting the minutes of real-world board meetings in 11 Israeli business 
companies during 2007-2009, including 155 board meetings, 247 board committee meetings, and 2,459 decisions 
made. Stiles (2001) tests these two theories by analysing data from 51 interviews with directors of UK public 
firms, 121 board secretaries and 4 case studies of UK public firms. 
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 China is a country with weak external corporate governance mechanisms, it provides us 
with a unique framework for looking at the missing links between board activities and the 
reduction of agency costs. Although the property rights and accounting standards in China are 
not as strong as in developed countries, Chinese firms have experienced an impressive growth 
rate (Allen et al., 2005). This might be partially explained by the monitoring function of 
directors, which is expected to be stronger than that in developed countries. For example, the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) emphasises the monitoring role of 
independent directors and, since 2003, has required them to issue an independent report after 
each board meeting, under the new corporate governance guidelines for Chinese listed firms 
(2001, 2002). The report must include the topics discussed in the board meeting and the 
independent directors’ opinion on the decisions made by the board. These reports are 
independent, objective and specifically aimed at meeting the requirements of the CSRC. Using 
the collections of Report[s] of the Independent Director from Chinese listed firms, we capture 
independent directors’ task-based activities on six major topics, namely personnel changes, 
compensation, management routines, firm control transactions, changes of equity structure and 
growth strategies.  
 We apply panel data techniques to explore the moderating effects of specific topics 
discussed at board meetings on the sensitivity between CEOs’ dismissal/compensation and 
firm performance. Furthermore, we extend our analysis by employing the instrumental variable 
(IV) and generalized method of moments (GMM) approaches to address endogeneity issues. 
Our key findings show that CEO dismissals and compensation are related to firm performance 
in China, suggesting that boards of directors are effective, at least to some extent, in contracting 
and monitoring executives in China. Regarding CEO compensation and its connection to firm 
performance, the relationship between compensation and firm performance is strengthened by 
additional board monitoring efforts, in terms of discussions of firms’ growth strategies (i.e. 
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investments and acquisitions). The relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance 
is weaker when there is more board monitoring activity on the nomination of directors and top 
management.  
 Our research contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, we contribute to the 
literature that examines board effectiveness and influence upon firm performance. The vast 
majority of prior studies on board influence focus on the number (e.g. Yermack, 1996), 
independence (e.g. Weisbach, 1988), reputation (e.g. Shivdasani, 1993), and gender diversity 
(e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009) of board members. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first paper that explicitly explores the extent to which the attention of the board on different 
topics affects the practice of corporate governance. We show that board activities related to 
different strategic decisions can alter the relationship between CEO interests and firm 
performance.  
  Second, we contribute to the dynamic debate among academics and practitioners as to 
whether board meetings are meaningful. We provide novel empirical evidence linking boards’ 
decision performance with governance at the firm level. Partly consistent with the prediction 
of the board process model that board task performance can improve firm performance (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999), some meetings have positive effects on corporate governance, although 
meetings with different foci have different effects. We also avoid the noise present in the annual 
meeting frequency measure used in previous empirical studies (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; 
Vafeas, 1999). 
 Last but not least, we extend the literature on the endeavor to achieve better corporate 
governance in a major emerging economy. In an environment with weak investor protection, 
centralized ownership, and an ineffective takeover market, the heavy burden of solving agency 
problems in China lies on the shoulders of the directors, and mainly the independent directors. 
We provide novel evidence on the effectiveness of the recently adopted independent director 
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system, and such directors’ reports, whereas prior studies only address inferences about board 
structure. Our findings support the use of policies that encourage directors to put more effort 
into monitoring firms’ strategic decisions and the link between CEO incentives and firm 
performance, instead of focusing on the number of board meetings alone. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide the 
institutional background and literature review. The following two sections describe the sample 
data and explain the research design. The penultimate section contains the empirical results 
and discussion. The final section presents our conclusions and discusses areas for further study. 
 
2. Institutional background and literature review 
2.1 Institutional Background and Corporate Governance in China 
China’s economic reform began with the study of the modern corporate governance system of 
western countries. In 1992, China introduced Germany’s two-tier board system, consisting of 
a main board and a supervisory board. In most stated-owned enterprises (SOEs), the 
government had a significant impact on the nominations and appointments for both boards. 
The top management of firms worked as bureaucrats, and the supervisory boards had little 
motivation and ambiguous accountability when it came to monitoring managers and firm 
operations (Allen et al., 2005; Conyon and He, 2011).  
 In order to deepen the economic reforms and protect the interests of minority shareholders, 
the CSRC mimicked the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in adopting new corporate governance 
mechanisms from 2001 onwards. It issued guidelines and regulations (2001, 2002) that 
compelled each listed firm to have independent directors on its main board and to improve the 
quality of its information disclosure. The proportion of independent directors was required to 
be at least one third by June 2003, while independent directors were required to publish the 
Report of the Independent Director after board meetings (CSRC, 2001). As a result, the 
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protection of public shareholder interests and the transparency of information disclosure have 
been improved (CSRC, 2004).  
 One year later, the independent directors’ system gained legal status for the first time, when 
it was authorized in the new Company Law of China (2005). Independent directors, as a group 
of corporate agents, are not affiliated with the listed firm or the controlling shareholders, and 
‘shall be especially concerned with protecting the interests of minority shareholders from being 
infringed’ (CSRC, 2002). Furthermore, they are legally liable for disclosing fraud and 
irregularities of listed firms through the Report of the Independent Director. The report must 
clearly state whether each independent director agrees with important managerial proposals 
discussed in the board meeting. Specifically, it is mandatory that they report how they voted 
on different types of firm decision (CSRC, 2001). The reports could be seen as an intense 
reflection of board monitoring, at least that by the independent directors. Tang, Du, and Hou 
(2013) show that independent directors’ dissent is a valid signal of the presence of effective 
corporate governance.   
2.2 CEO Dismissal, Compensation, Performance, and Boards 
The usual research approach for CEOs’ dismissal and compensation is to use agency theory 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Holmstrom, 1979; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In 
entrepreneurial firms without separation of ownership and control, owners keep track of firm 
performance and their own managerial efforts. Contrastingly, in large firms, the owners often 
hire managers to help with the firm’s operations. In such a setup, owners cannot accurately 
reward managers’ efforts without providing optimal contracts, or assess firm performance 
without incurring high monitoring costs. To solve the potential moral hazard problems of 
managers, associated with information asymmetry, agency theory states that CEO dismissal 
and compensation should be connected to firm performance. Therefore, the board of directors, 
the “ultimate internal monitor”, plays an important role in evaluating CEOs and disciplining 
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them (Fama, 1980). The board is responsible for designing a compensation contract that will 
motivate the CEO, rewarding acceptable firm performance, and punishing (and in extreme 
cases, dismissing) the CEO for poor performance.  
 The agency theory literature typically documents that CEO dismissal (compensation) is 
negatively (positively) related to firm performance (e.g. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; 
Defond and Hung, 2004; Denis and Denis, 1995; Kaplan and Minton, 2012). However, the 
pay/dismissal-to-performance sensitivity can in practice be weakened or eliminated by 
competition from the CEO’s peers within the top management team .board characteristics, 
ownership structure (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Gillan and Starks, 2003), institutional 
environments (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and even exogenous industry and market 
shocks (e.g. Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that the associations 
between CEO monetary incentives or dismissal and performance are statistically significant, 
but they may be economically too small to actually discipline CEO’s behaviors. They also 
hypothesize that public and private political forces impose constraints on incentives, which 
weaken the relationships. Recently, Kaplan and Minton (2012) found that annual CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity was higher for the period after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2000-
2007) than estimated in previous studies.  
 Questions of whether and how board composition and features influence the relationships 
between CEO rewards and firm performance have been in the focus of previous empirical 
studies. This is a key stream of research, featuring numerous articles that link firm-level 
outcomes (CEO turnover, compensation, takeovers, firm value and so on) to board size, 
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independence, diversity, directors’ shareholdings and other factors3. However, it is not clear 
whether these inferences are correct. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate how to 
measure board efforts directly, as well as the ways they influence corporate governance 
efficiency. 
 The empirical literature on CEO dismissal and compensation in China mostly shows that 
both the turnover-performance and compensation-performance relationships are statistically 
significant (e.g. Bai and Xu, 2005; Conyon and He, 2011, 2014; Firth, Fung, and Rui, 2006; 
Kato and Long, 2006b). However, the statistical significance and magnitude of the coefficients 
may vary, depending on whether accounting or market performance measures are used. In our 
study, we include various accounting and market measures to compare the robustness of the 
results across choices of performance measures. In the board effectiveness model (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1998, 2003), the primary tasks of the board are to hire/fire management and 
provide it with strong contractual incentives.  
2.3 Topic-Focused Board Meetings and Corporate Governance 
The effectiveness of the board in controlling firm decisions is a key factor explaining the 
survival of listed firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). The board meeting is the main venue for 
directors to fulfill their duties and responsibilities, implement their roles, and contribute to the 
decision-making process (Lawler and Finegold, 2006). Moreover, board meetings could be 
considered milestones in the board decision-making process. The board processes model 
                                                 
3  Copious research studies find board characteristics to be causally associated with corporate governance 
mechanisms. These characteristics include independent director composition (Dah et al., 2014; Guthrie et al., 
2012; Weisbach, 1988), board size (Coles et al., 2008; Yermack, 1996), CEO-chairman duality (Goyal and Park, 
2002; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), female and minority-group directors on the board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; 
Carter, 2010), and directors’ shareholdings (Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997). 
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(Forbes and Milliken, 1999) suggests that directors’ efforts, interactions, and communication 
in board meetings could increase the efficiency with which board tasks are performed. Cornelli, 
Kominek, and Ljungqvist (2013) also find that gathering information through active 
monitoring helps boards learn about CEOs’ abilities. Therefore, board meetings could 
represent a breakthrough with regards the black box of board effectiveness.  
 However, previous studies on board meetings most often depict them as rather 
homogeneous and monolithic (Monks and Minow, 2011; Tricker, 2009). Recent studies have 
shown significant variations in the ways in which board meetings are run. Ocasio and Joseph 
(2005) suggest that the topics on which boards focus, and even the board routines, can vary 
remarkably between corporations, with the micro-processes and topics covered potentially 
revealing large differences between boards. Using the number and length of board meetings as 
measures of board activity and diligence (e.g. Brown and Caylor, 2006; Vafeas, 1999;  Adams, 
2005; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010) is a very useful first step, but may leave important gaps 
in the literature’s understanding of the board process (He and Huang, 2011). Board meetings 
have also been criticized for the fact that routine tasks and inefficiencies occupy the limited 
time that should be available for exchanging information and establishing collaborations 
among board members (Jensen, 1993). Furthermore, previous research mostly focuses on the 
largest public US firms with relatively dispersed ownership. Boards of firms without large 
shareholders presumably have less incentive to engage in monitoring and performance 
improvement. This could be why earlier studies have failed to find a significant relationship 
between the frequency of board meetings and CEO turnover-performance or pay-performance 
sensitivities (see Cornelli et al., 2013; Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan, 2008).  
 Only few studies have examined the relationship between firm performance and meeting 
frequency. For example, they find that poor performance cause a higher frequency of board 
meetings (Adams, 2005; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Vafeas, 1999). However, these studies 
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have contradictory views about the impact of a higher frequency of board meetings. Vafeas 
(1999) points out that abnormal board meetings have a positive effect on corporate day-to-day 
operations. In contrast, Brick and Chidambaran (2010) suggest that board meeting frequency 
helps identify investment opportunities rather than improving internal operations.   
 Board meetings can be seen as a set of discussions and decisions based on topics. For 
example, from the strategies and progress monitoring perspective, topics may range from 
senior management proposals being reviewed and approved, to the board’s direct involvement 
in the strategic formulation process (e.g. Cornforth, 2001; Ingley and Van der Walt, 2001). In 
terms of monitoring the agency costs on behalf of the shareholders, topics would cover 
compensation and nominations. A higher frequency of meetings on one particular topic will 
improve the information exchange on this topic among the board members. Taking advantage 
of the Chinese independent directors’ reports, we are able to measure board efforts more 
accurately, and fill the research gap by investigating which type(s) of board activity affect (and 
if so whether they strengthen) CEO turnover/compensation-to-performance sensitivity.  
 
3. Research Method  
3.1 Sample selection 
We collected independent directors’ reports for all the non-financial firms listed on the Main 
Boards of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over the period of 2003-2010, from 
the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The public release of 
these reports began in 2001, and became compulsory in 2003. During 2003-2005, the reports 
were issued by listed firms ‘voluntarily’ as the CSRC requirements for issuing such reports 
were not explicit. The Information Disclosure Standards (CSRC, 2005) further clarified the 
disclosure requirements, improving the quality and quantity of the reports. After 2005, the 
number of independent directors’ reports increased accordingly. There were around 17,600 
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independent directors’ reports in the CSMAR database. For each report, the CSMAR recodes 
the firm’s stock code, the issuing date, the topics discussed, the independent directors’ opinions, 
and the entire contents of the report (see Appendix A for an example of an independent 
directors’ report). When independent directors have differing opinions, they may release 
separate reports. Hence, we screened 350 abnormal reports and dropped those whose content 
were the same as that of the aggregated reports, to avoid overestimating the frequency of board 
meetings. The final sample contains 17,548 reports. 
 In Table 1, we group the 11 mandatory disclosure subjects recorded in the CSMAR into six 
major topics. 4  For example, the “management routines” topic includes meetings on 
issuing/amending annual reports and auditors’ reports, which form part of the accounting and 
auditing disclosure and may also be related to earnings manipulation and financial fraud (e.g. 
Chen et al., 2006). “Corporate control transactions” involves related-party transactions, loan 
guarantees, and the disposal of assets, which may be associated with a manager’s or controlling 
blockholder’s “tunneling or propping” behavior (e.g. Peng, Wei, and Yang, 2011). “Change of 
equity structure” incorporates ownership changes and equity division reform (the transfer of 
non-tradable shares to the market)5, which may influence a firm’s ownership structure and thus 
cause a change in corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. Cao, Pan, and Tian, 2011; Hou et 
al., 2013). Finally, “growth strategies” contains the use of IPO proceeds, investments and 
acquisitions, which have been strongly related to the sensitivity of CEO pay to performance in 
                                                 
4 Eleven groups are categorized into six topics by their content and roles in corporate governance. We also 
estimate using meeting number of eleven groups in robustness test, our main results are unchanged. 
5 The split-share-structure reform in China has enabled state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted 




the US (Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang, 1996; Smith and Watts, 1992). There is often more 
than one topic discussed at a board meeting. We use the frequency with which a topic is 
discussed at board meetings, over a year, as the proxy for board monitoring activity on this 
particular topic.  
 We also obtained other financial and corporate governance information from the CSMAR. 
We applied a number of screening procedures to our initial dataset. First, we excluded financial 
firms, because their regulations and accounting standards are dissimilar to those for other firms. 
Second, we only included those firms with at least three consecutive fiscal years of capital 
market and financial statement data. Third, to alleviate the influence of extreme values, all 
firm-level data were winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. This screening process yielded 
10,239 firm-year observations over seven years. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Inset Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.2 Research Variables 
 CEO Dismissal. The top executive in a Chinese firm is often the chairman (or general 
manager) of the board, who is the legal representative of the firm, works full time, and is 
involved in the firm’s daily decision making (e.g. Conyon and He, 2011; Kato and Long, 
2006a). Consistent with previous studies, we adopt the title of CEO for the top executive to 
avoid confusion. CEO dismissal is coded as a dichotomous variable, which equals one if a CEO 
is forcefully dismissed, and zero otherwise. We exclude voluntary turnovers because of health 
issues or retirement, based on public information (recorded in the CSMAR dataset), retaining 
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only the forced ones, in line with previous studies (e.g., Chang and Wong, 2009; You and Du, 
2012).  
 During our sample period, we identify 1,537 forced CEO dismissals among the 9,485 firm-
year observations (Panel A of Table 2). If a firm has two or more turnovers in one fiscal year, 
we only count the last one. The likelihood of forced CEO turnover is approximately 16%, 
implying an average CEO tenure of less than five years, which is consistent with the study of 
Conyon and He (2014) and similar to the turnover rate in the US (Kaplan and Minton, 2012). 
Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) point out that it is challenging to determine whether a CEO 
retired, left voluntarily, or was actually forced out, since firms are not entirely open about the 
precise process. Kaplan and Minton (2012) find that board-driven turnovers, both forced and 
unforced, show similar patterns, which suggests that turnover labelled as unforced is actually 
not optional. If we were to focus only on forced CEO turnover based on public information, 
we could underestimate the capacity of the board to monitor the CEO. Therefore, we also use 
a term “mixed CEO dismissal” as the dependent variable in a robustness check.  
 CEO Compensation. Executive compensation schemes in China typically include only 
cash salaries, bonuses, and stipends. Although stock options have been permitted by the CSRC 
since 2005, their adoption in equity compensation is rare: only 15% of CEOs received equity 
grants in 2005, climbing to 3.5% in 2010 (Conyon and He, 2012). Empirical studies estimate 
that Chinese executives may receive “perks” from their companies, accounting for 
approximately 15-32% of total compensation, but they are rarely disclosed in financial reports 
and difficult to assess using public data. Hence, compensation in this study is the reported sum 
of cash salaries, bonuses, and stipends. Because disclosure of the compensation of individual 
executives and directors was not required by the CSRC prior to 2005, the CEO compensation 
is measured as the average compensation of the three highest-paid management executives and 
directors in a firm, consistent with prior research (see e.g. Conyon and He, 2012). 
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 Panel A of Table 2 shows that executive compensation has risen rapidly. The amount paid 
in 2010, of about 527,000 RMB (77,200 USD), was almost triple that in 2003 (181,000 RMB 
/ 21,860 USD). Over the sample period, the average executive payment was 329,000 RMB 
(43,700 USD). Although the executive compensation is not as high as that in the US, it is ten 
times the average wage of employees in the same industry, according to the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China6. After 2005, individual compensation data are available; approximately 
40% of CEOs did not receive any compensation from the listed firms in our sample. These 
CEOs are likely to have received their salaries from the mother company, or to have held a 
large proportion of shares. We use the individual compensation data as the dependent variable 
in robustness tests.  
 Topic-Focused Meetings. Panel B of Table 2 documents the meeting frequencies for each 
specific topic. Although the annual number of meetings does not change much (about eight or nine 
meetings per year, see last column of Table 2 panel A), the topics discussed at the meetings show 
significant variation. The huge differences in frequencies between 2004 and 2005 are due to the 
issuing of the Information Disclosure Standards (CSRC, 2005) mentioned earlier. Since 2005, 
proposals of firm control transactions (e.g. related-party transactions) have been the most 
frequently discussed topic, almost once per year per firm (over 1,300 times across the 1,200 or 
so firms). The nomination of directors and executives is the second most frequent, averaging 
at 500 times a year across the firms (about once every two years per firm). The number of 
meetings about compensation changes increases from 35 in 2005 to 106 in 2010, which is in 
line with the rapid increase in executive compensation over that period. The frequency of 
meetings on changes in equity structure is likely influenced by government policy. In 2005, 





the CSRC instigated a split-share-structure reform, setting a deadline for the end of 2006. As 
most of the equity structure changes were related to non-tradable shares owned by SOEs or 
government agencies being transferred to tradable shares, the frequency of meetings on equity 
structure changes peaked at 1,023 in the year 2006.  
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Inset Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
3.3 Regression Models for CEO Dismissal and Compensation 
To examine the impact of topic-focused meetings on the sensitivity of CEO dismissal to firm 
performance, we estimate six series of panel data logistic regressions, for firm i in year t: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ( 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1,  𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡−1,   
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1  ×  𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1)    (1) 
 To test the effect of topic-focused meetings on the correlation between compensation and 
performance, we estimate six series of linear regression models using fixed effects: 
 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1,  𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡−1,   
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1  ×  𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡−1, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡−1)   (2) 
Fixed effects estimators can help to control the heteroscedasticity and endogeneity issues 
caused by unobserved firm-specific influences or measuring errors in regressions (Hsiao, 2003; 
Wooldridge, 2002). We can also partly mitigate the endogeneity issue by using lagged values 
of all independent variables to facilitate causality. See the section on robustness checks for 
further considerations of the endogeneity issues (IV and GMM method). 
 We use three accounting performance measures (return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), and profit margin) and two market performance measures (the ratio of market value to 
book value and stock returns) to assess firm performance. In order to examine whether the 
holding of topic-focused meetings has an impact on performance-related CEO dismissal and 
16 
 
compensation, we include interaction effects of the frequencies of meetings on the six major 
topics individually. In other words, for each type of meeting, we take 
 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡−1  and the interaction term 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1  ×
 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡−1 in the regression models. The method of interaction 
terms is commonly applied in economics and finance research (e.g. Firth et al., 2006; Kato and 
Long, 2006b; Weisbach, 1988; You and Du, 2012). A positive (negative) value for the effect 
of the interaction term would imply that the higher was the frequency with which topics were 
discussed at board meetings, the greater would be the sensitivity between performance and 
CEO compensation (turnover). 
 The vector of control variables can be divided into three parts, namely measures of board 
governance, ownership structure, and firm size7. Board size is the logarithm of the number of 
directors serving on the board. The entrenchment of the CEO is captured by Duality, an 
indicator variable that equals one when the CEO (chairman) is also the general manager and 
zero otherwise. Independent directors % is measured as the percentage of independent 
directors on the main board. Directors’ shareholdings % is calculated as the percentage of 
ownership held by the top management, including directors, supervisory directors, and senior 
managers. State-owned enterprises is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the firm is 
controlled by a mother SOE or government agency, sourced from the CSMAR based on the 
ultimate control rights of the firm. Majority shareholder is a dummy variable that equals one 
when the firm has a majority shareholder (over 50% ownership). To control for firm size, 
log(firm size) is defined as the logarithm of the number of employees. A set of year dummies 
                                                 
7 Our key results remain unaltered after considering CEO characteristics, such as CEO tenure and age. 
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is included to control for macro-economic shocks, and industry dummies based on the CSRC’s 
code. 
 Weisbach (1988) and Dah et al. (2014) find that outsider-dominated boards have a higher 
probability than insider-dominated boards of firing the CEO due to poor firm performance. The 
results on the relationship between board independence and CEO compensation are mixed (e.g. 
Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan, 2012). CEO duality lowers the probability of the CEO being 
sacked (Goyal and Park, 2002), while it has mixed effects on compensation’s sensitivity to firm 
performance (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). In fact, the effects of CEO duality rely heavily on the 
complexity of the firm (Brickley et al., 1997). Yermack (1996) reveals that board size is 
negatively associated with firm value, while Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) demonstrate 
that the relation is U-shaped, with larger and more diversified firms requiring larger boards to 
provide more experience, knowledge, and advice. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) document 
that high shareholdings of managers and directors are beneficial for internal monitoring efforts. 
 Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the main independent variables. About 70% of 
the listed companies in our sample are SOEs. The means of ROA, ROE, and the profit margin 
are .05, .04, and .04 respectively. The ratio of market value to book value is 1.60 and the 
average stock return is .46, which is consistent with prior research (Conyon and He, 2011, 2012; 
Kato and Long, 2006a). The average number of board members is 9.25 (log value = 2.225) and 
independent directors make up 35% of them (the legal requirement has been one third since 
2003). About 12% of firms have a CEO with dual leadership roles. The top management 
shareholdings are very low at 0.5%. The pairwise correlations between the variables are 
provided in Appendix B. There are only modest correlations among the independent variables. 
The values of the variance inflation factors (VIFs) range from 1.02 to 1.86, and all the values 
are strictly less than 3, indicating that the regression analysis is free from multicollinearity 




Inset Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
4. Regression results 
4.1 CEO Dismissal, Firm Performance, and Topic-Focused Board Meetings 
In this section, we examine whether topic-focused board meetings affects the CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity. The dependent variable is set to one if the CEO has left unwillingly 
and zero otherwise. Table 4 presents the results of the logistic regressions with random effects 
based on equation (1)8, with firm performance measured using accounting measures (Panel A) 
and market measures (Panel B), respectively. The marginal effects at the median points of all 
the independent variables are reported. We also estimate the marginal effects at the mean and 
the untabulated results are similar. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Inset Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 4 indicates that CEO dismissal and firm performance are negatively associated, after 
controlling for firm-level governance and characteristics. First, we find CEO dismissal to be 
significantly negatively correlated to all lagged accounting-based performance measures, 
across all models. We also find that the effects of lagged stock returns on CEO dismissal are 
significantly negative, while no such effects are established for the market to book value. Our 
                                                 
8 We also estimate equation (1) using fixed effects, and main results are consistent with the ones using random 
effects. Given the importance of some time invariant variables such as State-owned enterprises and Majority in 
Chinese market studies (e.g. Conyon and He, 2012; Kato and Long, 2006b), in this study we report estimation 
results with random effects.  
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results are consistent with previous studies (e.g., Chen, Firth, and Xu, 2009; Conyon and He, 
2012; Kato and Long, 2006b). Overall, our models suggests that CEO dismissal has a 
significantly negative relationship with firm performance. 
 To test and evaluate the effects of topic-focused meetings on turnover-performance 
sensitivity, we introduce two variables, namely 𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑  𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡−1 
and an interaction term 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡−1  ×  𝑡𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑖𝑡−1. For 
board meetings that discussed personnel changes involving directors, the CEO, and top 
management, the coefficients on the interaction term are significantly positive for all the 
accounting performance measures. This relationship does not hold for the market performance 
measures. These results suggest that the existence of board nomination meetings reduces the 
sensitivity of forced CEO dismissals to firm performance. Other board meeting topics are not 
likely to affect the dismissal-performance link. We also plot the impact of firm performance 
on CEO dismissal for each type of meetings in Figure 1. Based on the results reported in 
Table 4 when the performance is measured as ROE, we calculate selected percentiles of the 
empirical board meeting distributions by using the point and interval estimates. The point 
estimates 9(solid line) and 95% confidence interval (dash line) for each derivative are displayed 
separately for six types of meetings (Panel A- F). If a certain type of board activities enhance 
the relationship between CEO dismissal and firm performance, the sensitivity of CEO 
dismissal to firm performance should be greater (more negative) with a higher level of 
monitoring activities, showing a downward trend. Among six types of meetings, upward trends 
of three types of meetings (Panel A for nomination, Panel C for management routines and Panel 
E for change of equity structure) suggest that these topics based board meetings reduce the 
                                                 
9 The plots show ∂(ΔCEO dismissal)/∂(firm performance) as the changes of each meeting number.  
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CEO dismissal- performance sensitivity. Although the other three types of meetings (Panel B 
for compensation, Panel D for corporate control transaction and Panel F for change of equity 
structure), have downward trends, these impacts are not significant. Overall, the results indicate 
that nomination meetings are likely to weaken the relationship between CEO dismissal and 
firm performance.    
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Inset Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 In addition, the coefficients of management routines meetings are positively significant, 
which implies that firms with more meetings discussing the financial report, auditor switches 
and changes of audit opinion are more likely to fire the CEO. The amendment of financial 
reports and changes of auditor opinion are probably related to poor firm performance and 
corporate governance problems. Management routine meetings help director to identify the 
weakness of firm performance, which could put more pressure on a firm to fire its CEO. The 
number of CEO/chairman duality and directors’ shareholdings have negative effects on the 
probability of forced CEO dismissal. The latter is also positively related to state share 
ownership, which is consistent with the finding of You and Du (2012). Firms with more 
employees have a lower probability of forcibly dismissing their CEO. The coefficients of 
percentage of independent directors are negative, but not significant, which is consistent with 
the findings of Kato and Long (2006a) on Chinese market. 
4.2 Compensation, Firm Performance, and Topic-Focused Board Meetings 
 Table 5 reports estimates from equation (2), in which we use panel data techniques with 
fixed effects to examine the effects of topic-focused boarding meetings on the link between 
executive compensation and firm performance in China. Compensation comprises salary, 
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bonuses, and stipends. Panel A reports the accounting-based performance measures: ROA, 
ROE, and the profit margin; panel B reports the market-based performance measures: Market 
to book value and the stock return. The sub-columns 1 to 6 represent each of the board meeting 
topics. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Inset Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 5 shows that there is a positive relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance. To begin with, we find that all of the accounting-based measures of firm 
profitability have significantly positive influences on executive compensation, across all 
models. This indicates that a CEO’s pay is generally higher when accounting performance is 
good. Secondly, we find executive compensation and stock returns to be positively associated, 
but no significant results for the market to book value. Our results coincide with prior research 
(Conyon and He, 2012; Firth et al., 2006). Overall, our models suggest that compensation is 
positively related to firm performance.  
 As for the interaction terms, all the coefficients of accounting-based performance interacted 
with the frequency of meetings on growth strategy are significantly positive. This indicates that 
the sensitivity between executive compensation and firm performance is higher when a firm 
has more meetings on growth strategy, which is consistent with our conjectures about the role 
of topic-focused meetings. We do not find similar results for the market measures of 
performance. Moreover, none of the interactions between other meeting topics and firm 
performance is statistically significant. Figure 2 displays the impact of firm performance on 
CEO compensation for each type of meetings. If a certain type of board activities enhance 
the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, the CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity should be greater (more positive) with a higher level of monitoring activities, 
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showing an upward trend. For three types of meetings (Panel A nomination, Panel C 
management routines and Panel E change of equity structure), the downward trends suggest 
that the increase of frequency of meetings is likely to decrease the sensitivity of CEO 
compensation to firm performance. Although meetings on compensation (Panel B) and 
corporate control transaction (Panel D) seem to enhance the relationship between CEO 
payment and firm performance, the impacts are not statistically significant. The meetings on 
growth strategies (Panel F) demonstrate an upward trend line with narrow confidence intervals. 
Overall, the results signify that more meetings discussed firms’ mergers and acquisitions and 
the use of IPO proceeds would improve the linkage between compensation and firm 
performance. 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Inset Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Additionally, we find that firms that hold more meetings discussing nomination or 
compensation may provide higher CEO compensation. This could be seen as evidence of the 
strong bargaining power of Chinese CEOs. Board size and the proportion of independent 
directors tend to have a positive effect on CEO compensation, as do the existence of a major 
shareholder and firm size which is consistent with Cao et al., (2011). However, state-owned 
firms are no different to other firms when it comes to CEO pay level coincided with Conyon 
and He (2011). 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
5.1 Alternative measures of CEO dismissal and compensation.  
 As mentioned when we defined the variable of CEO dismissal, using public information to 
classify forced or unforced CEO dismissals may be problematic. Following previous research 
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(e.g., Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Kato and Long, 2006b), we employ a binary variable that 
equals one to measure any type of CEO personnel change, regardless of the reason for dismissal. 
We re-estimate the logit equation (1) using this new definition of CEO dismissal (forced and 
unforced) as the dependent variable to test our hypotheses H1a and H2a. Our results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained using forced CEO dismissal. 
 We also use the individual-level CEO payment data available from the year 2005 as a 
robustness check, the sample including 3,454 listed-firm-year observations over the period of 
2005-2010. The results based on the individual data are similar to those based on aggregate 
compensation (Appendix C). The coefficient on the interaction term (nomination meeting 
frequency × ROA) is significantly negative, which suggests that the link between executive 
compensation and a firm’s accounting performance is likely to be weakened by such meetings. 
Unreported results for ROE and the profit margin are similar to those for ROA. 
 Furthermore, considering the influence of the compensation paid to peers in the same 
industry, we use relative aggregate executive compensation as the payment measure. We 
calculate the relative aggregate executive compensation by subtracting the industrial median 
of the average compensation of the three highest executives in firms within the same industry 
and year. Our results are similar after performing this robustness check. 
5.2 Relative Performance Measures.  
 For the sensitivity analysis, we also adopt industry-adjusted performance measures, since 
the evaluation of a CEO’s performance may be based on his/her industry peers (e.g. Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). The firm’s relative performance is measured as the firm’s 
performance minus the median performance of firms in the same industry and year. The 
unreported outcomes remain qualitatively similar. We also use a different time period (2005-
2010 instead of 2003-2010), reflecting the change in disclosure quality after 2005. Again, our 
main results stay qualitatively unaltered. 
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5.3 Eleven meeting topics recorded in the CSMAR 
 In order to test whether our results are affected by grouping strategies on meeting topics, we 
re-estimate equations (1) and (2) using meeting frequencies of eleven topics recorded in the 
CSMAR  (see Column 2 of Table 1). Except for meetings on nomination, the interactions of 
other types of meetings are not significant for CEO dismissal and performance sensitivity. 
Regarding the CEO compensation sensitivity to firm performance, the interactions of meetings 
on merger and acquisitions (6) and use of IPO proceeds (9) and firm performance are positively 
significant, while other interactions are not significant. Meetings and merger and acquisitions 
(6) and the use of IPO proceeds (9) were combined into meetings on growth strategies in the 
main analysis. Therefore, unreported results for eleven meeting topics show consistent results 
with our main analysis based on the six major topics. 
5.4 China-specific control variables.  
 As our study is based on Chinese listed firms, we further add more control variables to 
considers the special institutional and economic environment. After the US board system has 
been introduced to China in year 2001, the supervisory board of directors still exists. Thus, we 
add the size of supervisory board to control for the potential effect of the monitoring from 
supervisors. Regarding the regional imbalances in economic growth, we add the Chinese 
government transparency index (or regional dummies) accordingly. Our key results remain 
unaltered after considering characteristics of the Chinese market. 
 5.5 Endogeneity Problems.  
 In addition, we adopt the IV and GMM (IV-GMM) method to control for potential 
endogeneity problems, particularly simultaneous causality concerns. We instrument the 
potentially endogenous variables of firm performance and topic-focused board meetings using 
a set of exogenous variables, selected according to economic rationales.  
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   Following the literature, we instrument the firm performance using the second and third lags 
of performance and the first lagged GDP, which could be correlated with the lagged 
performance, but not directly related to CEO compensation (e.g. González et al., 2014; Shin 
and Seo, 2011). We also use average-independence and average-board-meetings to capture the 
industry-average level of board independence and board activity 10 . Firms’ governance 
arrangements are likely to be associated with those of their peers in the same industry, due to 
having the same business arrangements and market environment (Liu et al., 2015). Therefore, 
the industry average of board independence and board activity could affect the board 
effectiveness of any firm in that industry, and thereby the frequency of board meetings. 
Moreover, since the stickiness of board meetings may be an issue, we use the second and third 
lag of topic-focused meeting frequencies as instruments in their own individual estimations.  
 We perform a “difference-in-Sargan-statistic” test to examine whether endogeneity exists 
in firm performance and topic-focused meetings. The results show that the topic-focused 
meeting frequency can actually be treated as exogenous in the CEO dismissal model, as the F-
statistics were insignificant in all cases. However, topic-focused meetings should be treated as 
endogenous in the compensation model, and firm performance as endogenous in both models. 
Next, we check whether the suitability of our instruments is confirmed by the identification 
tests. Based on the Sargan-Hansen test, we cannot reject the null that our instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error terms, that is, unrelated to CEO dismissal and compensation. The 
results of the Kleibergen-Paap rk and Stock and Yogo statistics for the weak identification 
problem are significant in all cases, rejecting the null that our instruments are weakly related 
                                                 
10 Average-independence is measured as the mean value of the percentage of independent directors in other firms 
in the same industry and year. Average-board-meetings is the mean value of board meeting frequency in other 
firms in the same industry and year. 
26 
 
to firm performance or topic-focused board meetings. Overall, our instruments are valid for 
reducing the simultaneous causality concerns (e.g. Baum, 2006; Wooldridge, 2002). The IV-
GMM estimates are in line with our earlier findings.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a better understanding of how board activity affects 
board effectiveness in linking CEO compensation/dismissal to firm performance. In our 
empirical examination, to measure board activity, we decided to move beyond the frequency 
and target the contents of board meetings. Board meetings, the main venue for directors to 
fulfill their monitoring obligations, are normally topic-focused. As shown in our data, the topics 
of meetings include the management and directors’ nominations and compensation, 
management routines, firm control transactions, changes in equity structure, and growth 
strategies. Although the role of board meetings has been widely discussed by academics and 
practitioners, previous studies tend to portray them as standardized at the firm level. 
 To fill this gap in the literature, we exploit a unique dataset on board meeting agendas of 
Chinese listed firms over the period 2003-2010. First, we examine whether the sensitivity of 
CEO dismissal (compensation) to performance is significantly negative (positive), which 
generally reflects the effectiveness of the board monitoring and even the efficiency of corporate 
governance. Secondly, we examine the influences of topic-focused meetings on these two 
sensitivities. The rationale behind this is that discussing certain topics could enhance the 
informativeness of the board, thus helping directors to strengthen those sensitivities, thereby 
improving the corporate governance mechanism. 
 Our results reveal that CEO dismissal is significantly negatively and compensation 
positively correlated to all of the accounting-based performance measures. However, the 
market-based performance measures play a limited role in explaining the probability of CEO 
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dismissal or the size of compensation. Our results suggest that a firm’s profitability is still the 
main criterion used to evaluate the CEO’s performance. We also find that the frequencies of 
meetings on major topics are diverse, as are the roles of such meetings in monitoring the top 
management. In particular, the sensitivity between CEO compensation and performance is 
stronger when there are more board meetings on growth strategies, such as mergers and 
acquisitions and applying IPO proceeds. When directors discuss firm growth strategies, they 
could obtain comprehensive information about history and current firm performance and future 
strategies. Our results suggest the soft information captured in board meetings is likely to 
influence directors’ evaluations of the CEO’s capability, and they will change the CEO 
compensation scheme accordingly, to motivate the CEO and other managers. Meanwhile, most 
of the major topics of board meetings are not likely to affect the sensitivity between CEO 
turnover and performance. In fact, meetings on nominations could even reduce both turnover-
performance and pay-performance sensitivity.  
 The findings of our study suggest that differences in the effects of different meeting topics 
on the CEO pay/dismissal-to-performance sensitivities and highlight the need for more tailored 
approaches towards board requirements. In the countries that carry out good ‘corporate 
governance guidance’ policies, regulators’ agendas have stayed focused on board composition 
and structure, and the total number of annual meetings, as the means to allow boards to best 
perform their duties. A sound board structure following such guidance alone cannot ‘make 
great boards great’ (Sonnenfeld, 2002). To a certain degree, our study reflects the complexities 
involved in the board decision-making process. Thus, it calls for a reconsideration of the 
current one-size-fits-all approach taken by the regulators. Particularly in China, the regulators 
should consider introducing regulations to prevent potentially self-interested behaviour from CEOs 
in making nominations and personnel changes to the directors and top management, which impacts 
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TABLE 1 
Specific Topics of Board Meetings in Chinese Public Firms. This table reports the specific major topics discussed in the board meetings of Chinese listed firms. The eleven 
categories (by CSMAR code) of meetings are based on the Code of Corporate Governance in China (2001). We combine some topics as they have similar effects. 
 
  
Major topics CSMAR code  
(According to CSRC requirements) 
Notes 
Nomination Personnel – 1 Including directors, CEO, and other senior executives 
Compensation Compensation - 2 Emolument of directors and executives 
Management routines Financial report - 3 
Audit - 7 
Approval of financial reports, profit distribution, amendments 
and supplements of reports, etc; switches of auditors, audit 
opinion.  
Corporate control transaction Related-party transaction - 4 
Loans Guarantees - 5 
Disposal of assets - 10 
Loan guarantees are promises by the listed firm (the guarantor) 
to assume the debt obligation of a borrower if that borrower 
defaults; disposal of assets means the gain or loss calculated as 
the net disposal proceeds, minus the asset’s carrying value.  
Change of equity structure Ownership changes - 8 
Equity division reform - 11 
 
 
Growth strategies Mergers and acquisitions - 6 






CEO Dismissal, Compensation and Board Meetings. This table reports the rate of CEO dismissal, the executive compensation (the average of the three highest-paid 
executives’ compensation), the annual number of board meetings, and the frequencies of board meetings on major topics, in Chinese public firms from 2003 to 2010. 
In panel A, the CEO dismissals rate refers to the percentage of CEO replacements in the single year in question. Executive compensation (000s RMB) is the average 
compensation of the three highest-paid executives and directors, including basic salary, bonuses, and other benefits. Annual number of board meetings expresses the 
average frequency of board meetings. Panel B shows the frequencies of meetings on the six major topics individually: nomination, compensation, management 
routines, corporate control transaction, change of equity structure, and growth strategies. 
A) Annual CEO dismissal rate, executive compensation and board meeting frequency 
Year Observations CEO dismissal Compensation (RMB 000 s) Annual meeting frequency 
2003 1069 0.19 180.98 7.59 8 0.186 180.981 7.593 
2004 1142 0.163 218.296 7.373 
2005 1216 0.171 234.334 7.515 
2006 1194 0.175 263.719 8.246 
2007 1205 0.155 348.931 9.878 
2008 1221 0.143 394.388 9.765 
2009 1196 0.142 443.337 8.729 
2010 1188 0.162 527.037 9.026 
Total 9485 0.162 328.803 8.533 
.  
B) Meeting frequencies on major topics 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Nomination 22 75 628 428 499 643 644 400 
Compensation 2 2 35 44 37 90 91 106 
Management routines 3 10 158 256 222 142 198 225 
Corporate control transactions 40 59 1370 1439 1543 1647 1641 1348 
Change of equity structure 6 5 467 1023 105 53 46 37 
Growth strategies 10 9 121 106 142 194 270 160 




Descriptive Statistics for Main Independent Variables 





ROA Net profit divided by total assets 0.049 0.048 0.067 0.026 0.078 9487 
ROE Net profit divided by shareholders’ equity 0.042 0.062 0.185 0.020 0.112 9487 
Profit margin Net income divided by operating revenue 0.044 0.047 0.208 0.015 0.103 9487 
Market to book value Market value of a firm divided by book value 1.597 1.223 1.046 1.026 1.746 9483 
Stock return Annual return with cash dividend reinvested 0.456 0.071 1.066 -0.262 0.978 9487 
Board size Logarithm of number of directors 2.225 2.197 0.210 2.197 2.398 9376 
Duality An indicator equals one if the same person acts 
as CEO and chairman, and zero otherwise 
0.118 0.000 0.323 0.000 0.000 9399 
Independent directors % Fraction of independent directors on board 0.352 0.333 0.050 0.333 0.364 9376 
Directors’ 
shareholdings % 
Percentage of shares owned by top 
management 
0.005 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.0002 9486 
State-owned enterprises Dummy equals one if the firm is controlled by 
the state or government agencies, and zero 
otherwise 
0.713 1.000 0.452 0.000 1.000 9487 
Majority Dummy equals one if the firm has a majority 
shareholder (shareholdings over 50%), and 
zero otherwise 
0.271 0.000 0.445 0.000 1.000 9481 





The Effects of Meetings on the Six Major Topics, on the Link between CEO Dismissals and Firm Performance. This table presents series of logistic regressions with random effects. CEO dismissal is the dependent variable, 
which equals one if the CEO leaves the job involuntarily, and zero otherwise. In panel A, firm performance is measured by ROA, ROE, and the profit margin respectively. In panel B, firm performance is measured by the 
market to book value and the stock return. Nominations, compensation, management routines, firm control transactions, changes of equity structure and growth strategies are the major topics discussed. Topic-focused 
meeting frequency is the annual meeting frequency for each topic. The interaction terms between firm performance and topic-focused meeting frequency capture the meetings’ moderate effects on the relationship between 
CEO dismissal and firm performance. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 3. Models are estimated over the period 2003-2010. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
A) Firm performance measured by accounting measures: ROA, ROE and profit margin 
CEO dismissal  1. Nominations; 2. Compensation; 3. Management Routines; 4. Firm Control Transactions; 5. Change of Equity Structure; 6. Growth Strategies 
  (1) ROA   (2) ROE    (3) Profit margin 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ROAt-1 -4.280** -3.774** -3.789** -3.916** -3.915** -3.821**             
 (0.528) (0.480) (0.496) (0.576) (0.497) (0.486)             
ROEt-1       -0.970** -0.766** -0.853** -0.757** -0.839** -0.762**       
       (0.141) (0.118) (0.124) (0.146) (0.124) (0.118)       
Profit margint-1             -1.154** -0.925** -0.954** -0.918** -1.049** -0.926** 
             (0.154) (0.140) (0.145) (0.160) (0.143) (0.141) 
Topic-focused meeting 
 frequency t-1 
-0.032 0.060 0.211** 0.020 0.008 -0.172 0.003 -0.055 0.246** 0.023 0.013 -0.171 -0.004 -0.066 0.235** 0.024 -0.024 -0.183† 
(0.049) (0.199) (0.079) (0.032) (0.082) (0.114) (0.046) (0.176) (0.079) (0.028) (0.070) (0.102) (0.046) (0.173) (0.078) (0.028) (0.072) (0.103) 
ROAt-1 × topic-focused 
 meeting frequency t-1 
0.966† -3.356 -0.038 0.033 0.210 -0.479             
(0.574) (2.700) (0.844) (0.363) (0.981) (1.403)             
ROEt-1 × topic-focused 
 meeting frequency t-1 
      0.277* -1.060 0.257 -0.045 0.246 -0.495       
      (0.129) (0.916) (0.158) (0.100) (0.244) (0.459)       
Profit margint-1× topic- 
focused meeting frequency t-1 
            0.479** -0.911 0.085 -0.059 0.733* -0.345 
            (0.171) (0.772) (0.272) (0.121) (0.327) (0.462) 
Log(board size) t-1 -0.128 -0.139 -0.141 -0.138 -0.138 -0.144 -0.156 -0.163 -0.159 -0.167 -0.167 -0.172 -0.142 -0.146 -0.150 -0.148 -0.145 -0.154 
 (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.175) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.176) (0.177) (0.176) (0.176) (0.177) (0.177) 
Duality t-1 -0.542** -0.539** -0.544** -0.541** -0.542** -0.543** -0.522** -0.520** -0.527** -0.522** -0.522** -0.522** -0.530** -0.529** -0.535** -0.531** -0.530** -0.532** 
 (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
Independent  
directors % t-1 
-0.680 -0.736 -0.764 -0.726 -0.727 -0.718 -0.677 -0.720 -0.749 -0.729 -0.713 -0.711 -0.612 -0.678 -0.703 -0.678 -0.664 -0.655 
(0.705) (0.704) (0.703) (0.703) (0.704) (0.705) (0.711) (0.712) (0.709) (0.710) (0.711) (0.711) (0.708) (0.710) (0.708) (0.709) (0.710) (0.710) 
Directors’  
shareholdings % t-1 
-3.206* -3.130* -3.094* -3.130* -3.171* -3.064* -3.243* -3.208* -3.135* -3.191* -3.239* -3.116* -3.327* -3.267* -3.198* -3.241* -3.312* -3.190* 
(1.445) (1.447) (1.443) (1.445) (1.445) (1.446) (1.460) (1.464) (1.459) (1.462) (1.462) (1.463) (1.453) (1.457) (1.452) (1.455) (1.454) (1.455) 
State-owned enterprises t-1 0.193* 0.192* 0.202* 0.193* 0.192* 0.191* 0.217** 0.216** 0.225** 0.219** 0.216** 0.215** 0.226** 0.225** 0.235** 0.226** 0.225** 0.222** 
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.082) 
Majority t-1 0.077 0.075 0.076 0.075 0.077 0.074 0.045 0.041 0.044 0.041 0.045 0.042 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.053 0.058 0.053 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Log(employees) t-1 -0.090** -0.089** -0.088** -0.090** -0.089** -0.089** -0.098** -0.098** -0.096** -0.099** -0.098** -0.097** -0.104** -0.103** -0.101** -0.104** -0.104** -0.102** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Year and industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Wald χ2 171.319 169.614 175.805 169.602 168.834 171.446 151.743 145.854 158.269 148.102 147.596 151.024 159.173 151.616 159.543 151.67 156.023 153.885 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




B) Firm performance measured by market measures: market to book value and stock return 
 1. Nominations; 2. Compensation; 3. Management Routines; 4. Firm Control Transactions; 5. Change of Equity Structure; 6. Growth Strategies 
  (4) Market to book value   (5) Stock return 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Market to book valuet-1 0.024 0.001 -0.008 -0.056 -0.006 -0.011       
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.053) (0.063) (0.051) (0.051)       
Stock returnt-1       -0.125* -0.123* -0.114* -0.175** -0.134* -0.135* 
       (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.063) (0.057) (0.056) 
Topic-focused meeting 
 frequency t-1 
0.060 -0.267 0.160 -0.062 -0.151 -0.419* 0.014 -0.041 0.316** -0.007 -0.008 -0.245* 
(0.086) (0.314) (0.143) (0.054) (0.134) (0.193) (0.051) (0.188) (0.096) (0.033) (0.082) (0.121) 
Market to book valuet-1× Topic-focused 
 meeting frequency t-1 
-0.032 0.093 0.056 0.047† 0.111 0.123       
(0.046) (0.146) (0.073) (0.028) (0.086) (0.091)       
Stock returnt-1× Topic-focused 
 meeting frequency t-1 
      -0.006 -0.086 -0.072 0.031 0.020 0.052 
      (0.038) (0.143) (0.068) (0.021) (0.067) (0.077) 
Log(board size) t-1 -0.208 -0.203 -0.210 -0.209 -0.208 -0.213 -0.201 -0.199 -0.202 -0.199 -0.200 -0.204 
 (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) (0.178) 
Duality t-1 -0.524** -0.522** -0.527** -0.521** -0.524** -0.524** -0.521** -0.519** -0.524** -0.520** -0.520** -0.521** 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) 
Independent  
directors % t-1 
-0.849 -0.828 -0.869 -0.856 -0.832 -0.805 -0.859 -0.844 -0.898 -0.858 -0.842 -0.825 
(0.716) (0.716) (0.714) (0.715) (0.715) (0.717) (0.715) (0.715) (0.713) (0.714) (0.715) (0.716) 
Directors’  
shareholdings % t-1 
-3.528* -3.518* -3.410* -3.483* -3.522* -3.382* -3.511* -3.505* -3.401* -3.487* -3.509* -3.386* 
(1.479) (1.478) (1.473) (1.475) (1.476) (1.478) (1.477) (1.479) (1.473) (1.477) (1.478) (1.478) 
State-owned enterprises t-1 0.227** 0.225** 0.238** 0.228** 0.227** 0.226** 0.221** 0.220** 0.231** 0.223** 0.221** 0.222** 
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
Majority t-1 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.002 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Log(employees) t-1 -0.105** -0.106** -0.104** -0.107** -0.106** -0.106** -0.107** -0.108** -0.105** -0.107** -0.107** -0.106** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Year and industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Wald χ2 102.291 102.313 112.608 104.779 103.45 106.797 107.102 107.227 118.748 109.353 107.047 110.766 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Firm-years 7867 7867 7867 7867 7867 7867 7867 7867 7867 7867 7867 7867 
 
Fig. 1. CEO dismissal-firm performance (measured as ROE) sensitivity of by six types of board 
meetings. Specifically, we plot ∂(ΔCEO dismissal)/∂(firm performance) as the changes of each 
meeting number. Horizontal axes denote number of meetings. Vertical axes show the sensitivity 














Fig. 2. CEO compensation-firm performance (measured as profit margin) sensitivity of by six 
types of board meetings. Specifically, we plot ∂(ΔCEO compensation)/∂(firm performance) as the 
changes of each meeting number. Horizontal axes denote number of meetings. Vertical axes show 





The Effects of Meetings on the Six Major Topics on the Link between Compensation and Firm Performance. This table reports results from panel data regressions with fixed effects. Compensation is equal to the 
nature logarithm of the average of the three highest-paid executives’ compensation. In panel A, firm performance is measured by ROA, ROE, and the profit margin respectively. In panel B, firm performance is measured 
by the market to book value and the stock return. Nominations, compensation, management routines, firm control transactions, changes of equity structure and growth strategies are the major topics discussed. Topic-
focused meeting frequency is the frequency of annual meetings on each topic. Interaction terms between firm performance and the topic-focused meeting frequency capture the meetings’ moderating effects on the 
relationship between compensation and firm performance. Other variable definitions are provided in Table 3. Models are estimated over the period 2003-2010. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01 
A) Firm performance measured by accounting measures: ROA, ROE and the profit margin 
Compensation 1. Nominations; 2. Compensation; 3. Management Routines; 4. Firm Control Transactions; 5. Change of Equity Structure; 6. Growth Strategies 
  (1) ROA   (2) ROE   (3) Profit margin 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ROAt-1 1.250** 1.177** 1.213** 1.193** 1.197** 1.114**             
 (0.147) (0.137) (0.137) (0.148) (0.142) (0.138)             
ROEt-1       0.207** 0.184** 0.204** 0.183** 0.201** 0.176**       
       (0.042) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.037) (0.035)       
Profit margint-1             0.218** 0.199** 0.219** 0.184** 0.212** 0.176** 
             (0.041) (0.038) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.038) 
Topic-focused meeting 
 frequency t-1 
0.016† 0.056 -0.009 0.003 -0.004 -0.026 0.011† 0.076** -0.014 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.011 0.076** -0.013 0.002 0.001 -0.003 
(0.008) (0.034) (0.016) (0.006) (0.013) (0.019) (0.007) (0.029) (0.015) (0.005) (0.009) (0.018) (0.007) (0.029) (0.015) (0.005) (0.010) (0.017) 
ROAt-1 × topic-focused 
 meeting frequency t-1 
-0.103 0.475 -0.089 0.003 0.012 0.750**             
(0.102) (0.453) (0.191) (0.068) (0.161) (0.208)             
ROEt-1 × topic-focused 
 meeting frequency t-1 
      -0.027 0.109 -0.043** 0.006 -0.062 0.201†       
      (0.022) (0.160) (0.016) (0.024) (0.043) (0.110)       
Profit margint-1× topic- 
focused meeting frequency t-1 
            -0.026 0.155 -0.077 0.025 -0.044 0.281** 
            (0.043) (0.137) (0.055) (0.030) (0.049) (0.079) 
Log(board size) t-1 0.106† 0.106† 0.106† 0.107† 0.107† 0.110† 0.118† 0.117† 0.119† 0.119† 0.120† 0.121† 0.107† 0.106† 0.107† 0.107† 0.107† 0.112† 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Duality t-1 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Independent  
directors % t-1 
0.370† 0.389* 0.389* 0.386* 0.389* 0.402* 0.391* 0.408* 0.409* 0.407* 0.410* 0.412* 0.379† 0.392* 0.394* 0.391* 0.395* 0.395* 
(0.196) (0.195) (0.196) (0.196) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.194) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.196) (0.194) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.194) 
Directors’  
shareholdings % t-1 
0.311 0.305 0.292 0.313 0.306 0.326 0.407 0.406 0.386 0.414 0.405 0.419 0.375 0.373 0.347 0.380 0.372 0.382 
(0.546) (0.549) (0.549) (0.551) (0.550) (0.549) (0.581) (0.584) (0.582) (0.587) (0.583) (0.582) (0.562) (0.563) (0.560) (0.567) (0.563) (0.554) 
State-owned  
enterprises t-1 
-0.064 -0.065 -0.064 -0.063 -0.063 -0.058 -0.071 -0.072 -0.070 -0.070 -0.070 -0.067 -0.074 -0.076 -0.074 -0.074 -0.073 -0.067 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Majority t-1 0.056* 0.056* 0.057* 0.056* 0.056* 0.056* 0.060* 0.061* 0.061* 0.061* 0.060* 0.060* 0.062* 0.063* 0.064* 0.063* 0.063* 0.063* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log(employees) t-1 0.041* 0.040* 0.040* 0.040* 0.040* 0.039* 0.036* 0.036* 0.036* 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 0.038* 0.039* 0.038* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Year and industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.415 0.416 0.415 0.415 0.414 0.416 0.404 0.406 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.405 0.402 0.404 0.403 0.402 0.402 0.404 




B) Firm performance measured by market measures: market to book value and stock return 
 1. Nominations; 2. Compensation; 3. Management Routines; 4. Firm Control Transactions; 5. Change of Equity Structure; 6. Growth Strategies 
  (4) Market to book value   (5) Stock return 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Market to book valuet-1 0.019 0.018 0.022* 0.012 0.018 0.016       
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)       
Stock returnt-1       0.037** 0.038** 0.039** 0.032** 0.039** 0.036** 
       (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Topic-focused meeting 
 frequency t-1 
0.015 0.111† 0.016 -0.002 0.019 -0.007 0.007 0.083* -0.015 0.001 0.001 0.005 
(0.013) (0.060) (0.028) (0.010) (0.024) (0.031) (0.007) (0.033) (0.018) (0.006) (0.011) (0.020) 
Market to book valuet-1× topic-focused 
 meeting frequency t-1 
-0.003 -0.016 -0.019 0.004 -0.014 0.014       
(0.007) (0.027) (0.016) (0.006) (0.018) (0.015)       
Stock returnt-1× topic-focused 
 meeting frequency t-1 
      0.004 -0.003 -0.000 0.004 -0.002 0.013 
      (0.005) (0.021) (0.011) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) 
Log(board size) t-1 0.115† 0.112† 0.116† 0.114† 0.116† 0.116† 0.109† 0.107† 0.109† 0.108† 0.109† 0.111† 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Duality t-1 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Independent  
directors % t-1 
0.416* 0.424* 0.426* 0.424* 0.427* 0.433* 0.424* 0.429* 0.434* 0.425* 0.430* 0.436* 
(0.196) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195) (0.197) (0.196) (0.197) (0.196) (0.197) (0.197) 
Directors’  
shareholdings % t-1 
0.542 0.546 0.506 0.549 0.544 0.590 0.581 0.574 0.561 0.579 0.574 0.606 
(0.632) (0.632) (0.628) (0.635) (0.633) (0.642) (0.625) (0.623) (0.624) (0.627) (0.625) (0.627) 
State-owned enterprises t-1 -0.074 -0.077 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.073 -0.076 -0.078 -0.076 -0.076 -0.076 -0.075 
(0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Majority t-1 0.067* 0.067* 0.068* 0.068* 0.068* 0.068* 0.066* 0.067* 0.067* 0.067* 0.067* 0.067* 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log(employees) t-1 0.040* 0.040* 0.039* 0.040* 0.040* 0.039* 0.042* 0.042* 0.041* 0.041* 0.041* 0.041* 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Year and industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.397 0.397 0.397 0.397 0.397 0.397 0.400 0.401 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.400 
Firm-years 7827 7827 7827 7827 7827 7827 7827 7827 7827 7827 7827 7827 
 
Appendix A 
An Examples of Independent Director’ Reports. Compensation (2) and Loan Guarantees (5) were discussed on 27 April 2007 in board meeting 
of Wuhan Zhongnan Commercial Group Co., Ltd (WHZS, 000785). 
Stock trading code: 000785 (SHE) 
Company name: Wuhan Zhongnan Commercial Group Co., Ltd (WHZS) 
Announcement date: 27 April 2007 
Independent directors: Tan, Liwen; Li, Yanping; Xie, Huobao 
Topic code: 2-Compensation; 5- Loan Guarantees  
Opinion type: unqualified opinion 
Content:  
Pursuant to the “Guiding Opinions on Establishing Independent Directors in Listed Companies”, “Shenzhen Stock Exchange Listing Rules”, 
“Articles of Association”, and other related regulations, we would like to issue the following opinion on WHZS’s following two following issues 
passed at the fourth meeting of the sixth session of the board of directors: 
 
First, to our best knowledge, we agree that compensations of directors and senior management in 2006 have meet the plan requirements-" the 
implementation plan of company directors and senior management compensation in 2006" approved by the annual General Meeting (2005). 
 
Second, based on the annual report 2006 of WHZS, the audit report 2006 (2007-421), and the “Special statement of controlling shareholders and 
other related parties possessing fund of the listed firm”  (2007-148) provided by Wuhan Zhonghuan Accounting Firms, we have carefully examined 
the incurred and accumulative amount of loan guarantees, we believe the loan guarantees for subsidiary companies in 2006 was 160 million RMB, 







 Correlation of Main Variables. CEO dismissal is a dichotomous variable, which equals one if the CEO leaves the job involuntarily, and zero otherwise. 
Compensation is equal to the nature logarithm of the average of the three highest-paid executives’ compensation. Other variables are lagged values. Meetings 
definitions are provided in Table 1, and other independent variable definitions are shown in Table 2. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 CEO dismissal 1                    
2 Compensation -0.078** 1                   
3 Nomination meetings -0.001 0.068** 1                  
4 Compensation meetings -0.009 0.098** 0.161** 1                 
5 Management routines 
meetings 
0.033** -0.028* 0.205** 0.117** 1                
6 Corporate control 
transaction meetings 
-0.003 0.149** 0.281** 0.159** 0.281** 1               
7 Change of equity 
structure meetings 
0.004 0.009 0.033** 0.009 0.069** 0.073** 1              
8 Growth strategies 
meetings 
-0.029** 0.077** 0.114** 0.114** 0.074** 0.225** 0.002 1             
9 ROA -0.098** 0.314** -0.035** 0.019† -0.064** 0.037** 0.007 0.022* 1            
10 ROE -0.096** 0.230** -0.049** 0.018† -0.070** 0.027** 0.006 0.036** 0.742** 1           
11 Profit margin -0.082** 0.230** -0.020† 0.012 -0.038** 0.027** 0.009 0.024* 0.729** 0.662** 1          
12 Market to book value -0.001 0.116** 0.064** 0.060** 0.076** 0.076** -0.096** 0.041** 0.149** 0.060** 0.072** 1         
13 Stock return -0.024* 0.191** 0.063** 0.016 0.087** 0.155** 0.099** 0.065** 0.176** 0.127** 0.115** 0.387** 1        
14 Board size -0.001 0.106** -0.016 -0.002 -0.038** -0.017† 0.006 -0.024* 0.056** 0.039** 0.045** -0.114** -0.027** 1       
15 Duality -0.052** -0.01 0.004 0.045** 0.029** -0.004 -0.001 0.006 -0.022* -0.01 -0.018† 0.059** 0.014 -0.084** 1      
16 Independent directors % -0.017 0.113** 0.074** 0.049** 0.046** 0.077** -0.007 0.057** 0.022* 0.028** 0.037** 0.112** 0.067** -0.256** 0.028** 1     
17 Directors’ 
shareholdings % 
-0.035** 0.081** 0.012 0.047** -0.020* -0.035** 0.003 0.053** 0.026* 0.030** 0.01 0.040** 0.010 -0.018† 0.053** 0.036** 1    
18 State-owned enterprises 0.035** 0.008 -0.036** -0.036** -0.057** -0.004 -0.004 -0.034** 0.001 0.025* 0.032** -0.140** -0.036** 0.173** -0.108** -0.069** -0.198** 1   
19 Majority 0.017 -0.032** -0.019+ -0.043** -0.050** -0.015 -0.027** -0.047** 0.115** 0.082** 0.101** -0.118** -0.057** 0.012 -0.069** -0.037** -0.073** 0.206** 1  




The Effects of Meetings on the Six Major Topics on the Link between CEO Compensation and Firm Performance. This table reports results from panel data 
regressions with fixed effects. CEO compensation is the pay that the CEO receives from the listed firm, and is the dependent variable. Firm performance is 
measured by ROA and the stock return. Nominations, compensation, management routines, firm control transactions, changes of equity structure, and growth 
strategies are the major topics discussed. Topic-focused meeting frequency is the frequency of annual meetings on a given topic. Interaction terms between firm 
performance and topic-focused meeting frequency capture the meetings’ moderating effects on the relationship between compensation and firm performance. 
Other variable definitions are provided in Table 3. Models are estimated over the period 2005-2010. †p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01. 
A) Firm performance measured by ROA and stock return 
CEO compensation 1. Nominations; 2. Compensation; 3. Management Routines; 4. Firm Control Transactions; 5. Change of Equity Structure; 6. Growth Strategies 
  (1) ROA   (2) Stock return 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
ROAt-1 1.086** 0.800** 0.845** 0.709* 0.879** 0.762**       
 (0.309) (0.275) (0.276) (0.310) (0.281) (0.283)       
Stock returnt-1       0.032* 0.035* 0.035* 0.028† 0.044** 0.029* 
       (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.015) 
Topic-focused meeting 
frequency t-1 
0.013 -0.040 -0.020 -0.015 -0.003 -0.072† -0.011 0.029 -0.022 -0.011 0.014 -0.046 
(0.021) (0.064) (0.031) (0.012) (0.022) (0.042) (0.017) (0.047) (0.033) (0.010) (0.022) (0.036) 
ROAt-1× Topic-focused 
meeting frequency t-1 
-0.385† 1.293 0.029 0.136 -0.102 0.875†       
(0.223) (0.878) (0.345) (0.155) (0.273) (0.476)       
Stock returnt-1× Topic-focused 
meeting frequency t-1 
      0.004 -0.003 -0.000 0.004 -0.002 0.013 
      (0.005) (0.021) (0.011) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) 
Log(board size) t-1 0.082 0.096 0.093 0.094 0.092 0.090 0.081 0.077 0.081 0.078 0.081 0.075 
 (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.143) (0.143) (0.144) (0.144) (0.143) (0.144) 
Duality t-1 0.122* 0.124* 0.123* 0.127* 0.124* 0.123* 0.124* 0.123* 0.124* 0.125* 0.121* 0.124* 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) 
Independent 
directors % t-1 
0.049 0.067 0.077 0.077 0.079 0.081 0.117 0.101 0.104 0.096 0.092 0.102 
(0.350) (0.351) (0.351) (0.352) (0.352) (0.354) (0.348) (0.349) (0.349) (0.348) (0.347) (0.350) 
Directors’ 
shareholdings % t-1 
0.292 0.286 0.279 0.271 0.291 0.300 0.514 0.510 0.489 0.500 0.490 0.566 
(0.619) (0.608) (0.625) (0.615) (0.620) (0.623) (0.629) (0.620) (0.636) (0.618) (0.631) (0.643) 
State-owned enterprises t-1 -0.174 -0.175 -0.176 -0.178 -0.177 -0.169 -0.180 -0.179 -0.177 -0.178 -0.183 -0.172 
(0.114) (0.112) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.112) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) 
Majority t-1 0.028 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.030 0.028 0.027 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Log(employees) t-1 0.059† 0.056† 0.056† 0.057† 0.055† 0.058† 0.060† 0.059† 0.059† 0.060† 0.059† 0.059† 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Year and industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm-years 3454 3454 3454 3454 3454 3454 3454 3454 3454 3454 3454 3454 
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